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Abstract—Digital certificates are usually essential for achiev-
ing secure communication in open and untrusted environ-
ments like the Internet. The Transport Layer Security (TLS)
protocol and its public-key infrastructure (PKI) are widely
used in today’s Internet to achieve such a secure communi-
cation. Validating domain ownership by trusted certification
authorities (CAs) is a critical step in issuing digital certifi-
cates, as the security of all subsequent connections depends
on this validation. Unfortunately, this validation process
provides a poor security level, and although many improve-
ments have been proposed to the date, they suffer from
security and deployability issues. In this work, we present
SmartCert, a novel approach to redesign and improve the
properties of digital certificates. SmartCert is empowered
by smart contracts and thanks to this technology SmartCert
can provide benefits of the existing PKI enhancements as
well as new desired functionalities and features. A certificate
in SmartCert conveys more detailed information about its
validation state which is constantly changing but only with
respect to the specified smart contract code and individual
domain policies. CAs issuing and updating certificates are
kept accountable and their actions are transparent and
monitored by the code. We also present the implementation
and evaluation of SmartCert, and our results indicate that
the system is efficient and deployable as today.
1. Introduction
Secure Internet communication often relies on digital
certificates that contain bindings between subjects (usually
domain names) and their public keys. It is security-critical
that these bindings are correct; otherwise, an adversary
able to obtain a certificate with an incorrect binding could
impersonate the attacked subject. In the TLS PKI [22],
CAs are obligated to validate the correctness of these
bindings and subsequently are allowed to issue certificates
stating it. Unfortunately, the validation process provides a
poor security level since it is conducted only once for the
certificate lifetime [12]. Moreover, the TLS PKI provides
the weakest-link security and an adversary compromising
a single CA (out of hundreds [58]) can issue a certificate
for any domain. A certificate also has to be accompanied
with its revocation status (as it can be prematurely invali-
dated) but designing a sustainable and effective revocation
system turned out to be a huge challenge [46].
There were many approaches proposed to solve or
mitigate these issues. Extended Validation (EV) certifi-
cates [29] try to introduce more secure public-key val-
idation by requiring a requesting entity to prove that
it has a legal control over the domain. Unfortunately,
EV certificates are unpopular [56], their security benefits
are questionable [19], [38], and their support in main
browsers may be deprecated in a near future [65]. An-
other approach is notary servers [48], [81], which contact
TLS servers and report observed public keys to a TLS
client that can compare its own view with the views of
notary server(s) prior to accepting the TLS connection.
Although properties provided by notary systems are de-
sired in an environment like the Internet, their deployment
issues thwarted their adoption. Certificate Transparency
(CT) [45] is a prominent log-based system which does
not improve the public-key validation process but rather
aims to make actions of CAs visible by logging all issued
certificates. There have been many proposals for a secure
and efficient revocation system [22], [44], [62]; however,
despite them, the current TLS PKI still cannot offer this
basic functionality [46]. The domain expressiveness in
the TLS PKI is also unsatisfactory. Domains can use
CAA [36] or DANE [34] to specify simple policies, like
their trusted CAs; however, these systems rely upon the
DNS/DNSSEC infrastructure causing inefficiencies, and
low security and deployability [68].
One important observation is that in the current TLS
PKI certificates are static; thus are: a) inflexible in terms
of adding and handling new features, and b) decoupled
from the information about their validity (like policies or
a revocation status). Such a design causes serious issues,
as the security and availability of the certificate validation
process are underpinned by multiple separate infrastruc-
tures (e.g., for revocation or logging). In this paper, we
present SmartCert, a framework where certificates are
empowered by smart contracts. This design choice gives
us an opportunity to rethink and redesign how digital
certificates can be maintained and expressed in order to
improve their security and flexibility. In SmartCert, certifi-
cates are dynamic objects carrying their validation states,
which are able to evolve according to pre-defined rules and
individual domain policies. These rules and policies are
self-enforced by a code; therefore, the trust placed in CAs
can be significantly minimized. We present SmartCert
in the context of improving dominant domain-validated
certificates but the framework can be extended to other
validation policies easily. SmartCert combines advantages
of previous systems and with “history-rich” certificates
provides new interesting properties beneficial for clients
and domains. SmartCert is deployable with the legacy
TLS infrastructure, requires small changes on involved
parties and does not require any new infrastructure to be
deployed. We implemented and evaluated SmartCert, and
our results indicate its efficiency and practicality.
2. Background
2.1. Notation
We use the following notation. H(.) is a crypto-
graphic hash function; ‖ is the string concatenation;
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{0, 1}n is a set of all n-bit long strings; r R←− A de-
notes that r is an element randomly selected from the
set A; Signsk (m) for a private key sk and a mes-
sage to sign m, creates the corresponding signature σ;
SigVrfypk (m, σ) returns True if the message m matches
the signature σ under the public key pk, False otherwise;
time() returns the current timestamp.
2.2. Transport Layer Security
The TLS protocol [23] provides security for the client-
server model and can be used to secure any application-
layer protocol; however, its main use case on the Internet
is HTTPS, i.e., running the HTTP protocol on the top
of TLS. (We focus on TLS 1.2 as it is currently rec-
ommended and widely deployed, but SmartCert can be
easily combined with TLS 1.3 as we discuss in § 7.4.)
TLS consists of multiple subprotocols, one of which is
the TLS handshake protocol. TLS handshake initiates a
TLS connection and is designed to negotiate a shared
symmetric key between a client and a server. During
an execution of this protocol, the communicating parties
decide to accept or reject the connection. There are many
ways this shared key can be negotiated; however, methods
based on the elliptic curve ephemeral Diffie-Hellman (DH)
protocol [14] are recommended and used by default by
modern TLS implementations [69], [70].
The TLS handshake with an ephemeral DH key ex-
change is presented in Fig. 1. It is initiated by the
client that sends a ClientHello message (CH) containing
a random value CH.r selected by the client (this value
is prepended with the client’s timestamp), a list of the
cryptographic methods that the client supports, and other
parameters and extensions (optionally). After receiving
the ClientHello message, the server prepares multiple
messages to send them back to the client. In particular,
the ServerHello message (SH) contains a random field cre-
ated analogically, while the ServerKeyExchange message
(SKE) contains authenticated information about the key
exchange. This information consists of the client’s random
value (CH.r), the server’s random value (SH.r), parameters
of the DH protocol, and the signature (σ) that protects
all these values. The SKE message is sent to the client
together with the server’s certificate (that allows the client
to verify the server’s signature and identity) and with the
ServerHelloDone message (SHD). Upon receiving these
messages the client performs multiple verification checks
Client Server
rc
R←− {0, 1}224
CH.r← time()‖rc
... CHGGGGGGA rs
R←− {0, 1}224
SH.r← time()‖rs
SKE.p← DHparams
m← CH.r‖SH.r‖SKE.p
SKE.σ ← Signsk (m)
SH,Cert ...
SKE,SHD
DGGGGGGGGGGGGGGpk ← Cert.pubkey
m′ ← CH.r‖SH.r‖SKE.p
if SigVrfypk (m ′,SKE.σ):... CKE
CCS,Fin
GGGGGGGGGGGGGGA ...
(finished) CCS,FinDGGGGGGGGGGGGGG
Fig. 1: A TLS handshake with an ephemeral DH key exchange.
including ensuring that the signature of the SKE message
was signed indeed by the entity from the certificate (it is
not presented in the figure but the certificate is also val-
idated at this stage of the protocol). The client computes
a shared key and establishes it with the server via the
ClientKeyExchange message (CKE). Then the parties ex-
change ChangeCipherSpec and Finish messages indicating
that the following communication can be encrypted.
2.3. TLS PKI and Certificates
TLS employs the X.509 PKI [22], where CAs are
trusted parties contacted by entities wishing to obtain
X.509v3 certificates [22]. In such a case, a CA is obligated
to validate the binding between an entity’s name and a
presented public key. If the CA successfully validates such
a binding, a certificate stating so can be issued. In the
TLS PKI, the public-key validation is conducted once per
certificate and is usually automated by following the trust-
on-first-use model over an insecure protocol like DNS,
HTTP, or e-mail [12]. It is called a domain validation
and this approach provides poor security as an adversary
able to launch a man-in-the-middle (MitM) attack even
for a moment [13], [31] can obtain a certificate (for the
attacked entity) which will be valid for several months. (A
sophisticated off-path attack was presented recently [16].)
In most TLS applications (like HTTPS), only servers
have certificates and usually, they are identified by their
associated DNS domain names. Clients verify certificates
by checking whether they are issued by CAs from the list
of trusted CAs (this list is provided by software vendors
— operating systems, browsers, or TLS implementations).
2.4. Blockchain and Smart Contracts
Blockchain platforms started emerging with the advent
of Bitcoin [53]. Bitcoin is a cryptocurrency which for
the first time introduced the concept of decentralized and
permissionless consensus combined with an immutable
data structure. This concept was quickly extended to
more powerful systems that besides monetary transfers
offer other features and functionalities. In particular, smart
contract platforms received a lot of attention, as aside
from simple monetary transfers they allow users to specify
arbitrary agreements that can be encoded in high-level
programming languages which these platforms offer. As
of writing this paper, Ethereum [17] is the most popular
and developed smart contract platform.
Ethereum is an open platform where anyone can make
a monetary transfer, submit its smart contract, interact with
other contracts, or become a miner (i.e., a node that is
running the underlying consensus protocol). It provides
its native cryptocurrency — ether. Ethereum users have
unique addresses (identifiers) that are encoded as hashes of
their public keys. Similarly, every smart contract instance
also has a unique address that is derived as a hash of
concatenated its creator’s address with a nonce. To interact
with the platform a user signs and sends a transaction
which transfers ether to another account or/and calls a
contract’s method (specifying the targeted contract, the
method to be called, and its arguments). Transactions
are collected by miners who execute them and run the
consensus protocol to append new transaction blocks to
the blockchain (it is required to keep a consistent version
of its global state). Callers have to supplement their trans-
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Fig. 2: An Ethereum’s block header with the associated trees.
actions by an execution cost called gas purchased in ether
from the miner who has appended the transaction to the
blockchain. Gas consumption depends on the operations
that the call executes.
Ethereum enables smart contracts to store a persistent
storage. The storage is maintained by miners and it is
part of the global blockchain state. Each contract has its
state associated, and this state can be accessed through the
state tree, which is an instance of the Merkle Patricia Tree
(MPT) data structure [27]. The state tree is authenticated
by including its root in each block header, as depicted in
Fig. 2. Using the tree, it is possible to efficiently access
a contract’s state that includes its nonce, its balance, the
hash of its code, and the root of another MPT storage tree,
including the contract’s storage. Besides accessing state
nodes, an MPT (as a Merkle tree variant) allows to prove
that a given leaf is part of the tree. It is realized with an
MPT proof, a set of nodes that allows to rebuild the tree’s
root. The size of this set is logarithmic in the number
of MPT leaves. Thanks to this design, it is possible to
prove to light clients [26] what is the current state (code,
balance, and nonce) or storage of a given smart contract
instance. Light clients are blockchain clients that store
only block headers without storing the entire blockchain.
For instance, to prove that a given storage is part of a
contract’s state, one provides a light client with a) an MPT
proof (of that storage) that roots in the contract’s state
node (i.e., StorageRoot, see Fig. 2), and b) an MPT proof
(of the state node) that roots in the state root encoded in a
block header (i.e., StateRoot, see Fig. 2). With only block
headers, a light client can easily validate these proofs by
rebuilding the corresponding MPT roots [26].
3. SmartCert Overview
3.1. System Model
SmartCert introduces the same parties as in the TLS
PKI. Domain provides a service via the TLS protocol
(e.g., HTTPS). We assume that services, and servers
that host these services, are identified by DNS domain
names. (For simple description, we use the terms “do-
main” and “server” interchangeably.) We assume that
domain’s servers can interact with the blockchain network,
obtaining MTP proofs. CA is a trusted party that certifies
bindings between identities and their public keys. We
assume that CAs have key pairs that can be used over the
blockchain platform, and CAs are able to send transactions
to the blockchain platform. CAs in SmartCert are similar
to TLS PKI CAs, except they are not completely trusted
and their actions are self-monitored and self-enforced by
a smart contract code and domain policies. Client wishes
to contact a service (served by a domain) in a secure way.
Clients trust CAs and they are also blockchain light client
able to obtain the blockchain block headers.
We assume that these parties can interact with a
blockchain platform that supports smart contracts. In par-
ticular, we focus on Ethereum; however, SmartCert can
be adjusted to most smart contract platforms available.
For demonstration, we assume various adversary models
and first, an MitM adversary is assumed. We assume
that MitM attacks are short-lived; otherwise, a permanent
attack would make every domain-validation scheme in-
effective [81]. The goal of the adversary is to conduct
an impersonation attack undetected. We assume that the
used cryptographic tools are secure and that the adversary
cannot undermine the security properties of the underlying
blockchain platform. Moreover, we assume that CAs can
misbehave by not undertaking their duties (or conducting
them incorrectly), but every such misbehavior should be
detectable. We also consider a stronger adversary who
in order to impersonate a domain can collude with m
malicious CAs; however, we assume that the domain can
always prove its identity to n honest CAs, for n > m.
3.2. Design Space
TLS PKI Issues Certificates in the current TLS PKI do
not provide a high level of security. We discuss some of
their design inherent issues that contribute to this state.
A public-key validation is conducted only once per the
certificate lifetime (i.e., prior its issuance) and certificates
are “static”, i.e., cannot be updated even if the claims they
contain are outdated or incorrect. For instance, a MitM
adversary able to impersonate a domain even for a moment
can obtain a certificate valid for several months. Moreover,
a certificate is asserted only by a single (any trusted)
CA what inherently limits its security. In particular, an
adversary compromising one CA can impersonate any
domain on the Internet, as we have seen in the past [1],
[63]. Next, certificates are decoupled from the information
about their validity, i.e., their content is insufficient to pro-
vide high guarantees to relying clients who validate them.
For instance, revocation information regarding a certificate
is not part of the certificate and is stored and managed
by a separate infrastructure. Thus, to fully validate a
certificate, a client has to obtain information from an ex-
ternal infrastructure. As a result, the certificate validation
depends on availability and security of multiple not well-
connected infrastructures. To illustrate this complexity
Fig. 3 depicts the currently deployed PKI infrastructures
and their interactions. Certificates are inflexible in terms
of introducing new functionalities and features, and their
abilities are bound by their format which contains signed
statements, assertions, and metadata produced at the time
of their issuance. For instance, current certificates cannot
be authenticated by multiple CAs, effectively providing
the same security level for all domains. Another issue is
a lack of domain expressiveness. Domains cannot specify
and enforce their security policies. In practice, it would
be beneficial if domains could specify secure and flexible
policies, like CAs authorized to issue their certificates or
a number of CAs that certificates have to be asserted with.
Design Rationale We argue that in order to signifi-
cantly improve the security of TLS PKI, a major redesign
of digital certificates and their ecosystem is necessary.
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Fig. 3: PKI infrastructures involved in the certificate validation.
First, certificates should be self-contained, carrying all
information needed to validate them, such that when a
client receives a certificate, she should be able to validate
it immediately without contacting any other parties or
infrastructures. A framework should improve the security
of TLS connections. It should integrate the state-of-the-
art security solutions and properties (like transparency)
and certificates should offer stronger authentication of
public keys (e.g., multiple validating CA) and it should be
possible for domains to express and enforce their security
policies (e.g., a list of trusted CAs). The framework should
also be able to provide desired features impossible or
difficult to provide now. One such example is key continu-
ity [33] indicating how long a public key is being used by
a domain. Implementing such functionalities would imply
that certificates are becoming rather “dynamic” as their
internal state change over time. The framework should be
efficient. For instance, many previous proposals for a re-
vocation system has failed due to their inefficiencies [46].
Lessons learned from these and other attempts are that:
a) clients should not incur excessive storage overheads,
and b) during TLS handshakes clients should not conduct
any blocking connections to third parties. The framework
should provide a viable and incremental deployment path.
In particular, it should be feasible to deploy the scheme
without major changes to the ecosystem and existing
protocols, or requiring new infrastructures.
The main observation behind SmartCert is that the
blockchain and smart contract technology allows us to re-
think and redesign the concept of a digital certificate, and
to propose a system that meets the stated requirements.
As depicted in Fig. 3, today’s certificate management and
validation is underpinned by multiple distinct infrastruc-
tures with different goals and operators; however, with
similar requirements (like availability and authentication).
We observe that functions of these infrastructures can
be easily implemented and potentially automated with
the blockchain technology and smart contracts. First,
blockchain platforms provide a good point of anchoring
trust as they are transparent, immutable, highly available,
and censorship resistant. Second, smart contracts enable
us to create objects that can carry states updatable by a
predefined code. In our case, we can represent a certificate
and its current validation state as such an object. Conse-
quently, the state can evolve, but only according to the
domain’s policy and the rules encoded in the correspond-
ing smart contract. For example, these rules may require
multiple authorized CAs to periodically conduct public-
key validations which then would be reported and checked
by the code itself. That would result in self-contained
and updatable certificates, where trust placed in CAs is
minimized as compliance of their actions is enforced and
audited by the code. Lastly, the data models of blockchain
platforms enable light clients that do not have to store nor
process the entire blockchain but still can benefit from it.
3.3. High-level Overview
In SmartCert, we propose to leverage smart contracts
to create dynamic, self-contained, extensible, and policy
self-enforcing certificates. The central point of our design
is to compose a digital certificate from its validation and
presentation logic. The validation logic maintains the cur-
rent validation state of the certificate and its compliance
with the domain’s policy, while the presentation logic
presents this information to clients. Following this design,
the following elements are central to SmartCert:
Policy contract is a smart contract that manages do-
mains’ security policies. Policies describe when do-
main’s certificates are considered as valid. We assume
that there is one global instance of this contract with
a publicly known address. Every domain can have a
single policy at the time and if there is no policy for a
domain the default policy is used.
SmartCert contract is a smart contract that implements,
encodes, and enforces the public-key validation logic
and policy compliance. The validation logic is ex-
pressed as a code (in the blockchain platform’s pro-
gramming language) with an associated storage. By
executing the logic, the contract modifies its internal
storage that reflects the validation state and its compli-
ance with the domain policy (accessed from the policy
contract). SmartCert contracts can implement arbitrary
logic, although we expect that only some, standardized,
validation logic will be used in practice.
SmartCert certificate is an information that, in a secure
and efficient way, presents TLS clients the current vali-
dation state of the contract. Clients accept or reject TLS
connections basing on SmartCert certificates presented.
Throughout the paper, we present SmartCert in a setting
where SmartCert certificates carry information about his-
torical public-key validations of a given domain conducted
by multiple CAs. However, SmartCert can be implemented
with almost arbitrary validation logic as it is only limited
by the smart contract language deployed. We discuss other
validation logic in § 7.5.
A high-level overview of SmartCert is presented in
Fig. 4 and its steps are outlined below.
1) In the first step, a domain creates its policy describing
a set of conditions that its certificates will have to
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Fig. 4: A high-level overview of the SmartCert architecture. Dot-
ted lines are for one-time operations, dashed lines for periodic
actions, and solid lines for the TLS client-server communication.
meet (e.g., what are authorized CAs or the maximum
certificate lifetime). To bootstrap the policy, the domain
contacts a number of CAs (at least one) with a request
to sign the domain’s policy. The CAs verify the do-
main’s identity, sign the policy, and publish it at the
policy contract. Policies can be updated subsequently;
however, every domain can have only one “active”
policy at the given time. The domain can skip this step
and rely on the default policy.
2) Then, the domain deploys a SmartCert contract on the
blockchain, created from a predefined (trusted) code
template. It is initialized with the data like the domain
name, the domain’s public key, and the CAs that will
be validating it. (We assume that the CAs are informed
about the contract either by looking at the blockchain or
out-of-band, e.g., via CA websites. In fact, the contract
can be deployed by a CA instead of the domain.)
3) Within every validation epoch (or just epoch), every
CA listed in the SmartCert contract is obligated to val-
idate the domain’s public key and update the contract:
a) a CA contacts the domain with a validation request,
b) the domain returns a validation proof which proves
that at the time the domain possesses the private key
corresponding to its public key from the contract,
c) the CA updates the contract with the validation
proof. The contract verifies it and updates its storage
accordingly, reporting all occurred errors if any.
d) Finally, the SmartCert contract checks if its valida-
tion state is compliant with the domain’s policy and
saves the outcome of this check as a validity status.
4) Periodically, the domain obtains from the blockchain
network fresh MPT proofs proving on the SmartCert
contract instance and its internal validation state.
5) For every TLS connection, the domain sends to the
client the SmartCert certificate that consists of the MPT
proofs accompanied with required metadata. The client
validates if a) the corresponding SmartCert contract
was created correctly (i.e., has the correct code), b) its
validity status is correct, c) and the MPT proofs are
authentic and fresh. Then, the client either accepts or
rejects the TLS connection.
SmartCert certificates carry historical information about
public-key validations conducted, like the number of er-
rors occurred or the last successful validation; thus, they
can be combined with sophisticated policies or they can
be used by domain operators to monitor validations.
4. SmartCert Details
4.1. Policy Creation and Update
To facilitate domain expressiveness SmartCert intro-
duces a global policy contract that contains a list of all
trusted CAs (identified by their public-key hashes) and
that allows domains to publish their certificate validation
policies. By registering a policy, a domain specifies a set
of rules that domain SmartCert certificates will have to
be compliant with. Whenever a domain wishes to register
its policy it contacts CAs (at least one) that check the
domain’s identity, sign its policy, and publish it with the
global policy contract mapping domain names to their
policies (see newPolicy() in Alg. 1). From that moment,
everyone can easily look up the domain’s policy by call-
ing getPolicy() of the policy contract. If a domain does
Alg. 1: Policy Contract.
dfltPolicy: the default policy; trustedCAs: the list of trusted CAs.
function init()
policies ← {};
function newPolicy(name, policy, sig[])
p ← getPolicy(name);
/* policy update via policy key */
if p 6= dfltPolicy and policy.type == UPDATE then
assert sender == p.KEYID ; policies[name]← policy ;
/* policy registration or replacement */
else if p == dfltPolicy or p.sigNo ≤ len(sig) then
assert len(sig) > 0 ; /* make sure at least one CA signs*/
for ca ∈ sig[] do
assert ca ∈ trustedCAs;
assert SigVrfyca (name‖policy, sig[ca]);
policy.sigNo ← len(sig); policies[name]← policy ;
function getPolicy(name)
if policies[name] then
return policies[name]; /* return policy if registered */
return dfltPolicy ; /* return default */
not register its policy, the default policy, with a relaxed
security level (similar to today browser policies), is used.
The main fields of a policy are: KEYID is a policy
management public key identifier (unset in the default pol-
icy) that allows a domain to: update the policy, revoke any
certificate claiming the domain name, and is mandatory
for creation of any certificate claiming the domain name.
As these actions are infrequent, the corresponding private
key can be stored offline. CAs is a subset of trusted CAs
authorized to keep validating domain certificates (every
trusted CA is authorized by default); MAX_LIFETIME is
the maximum lifetime a domain’s SmartCert certificate
can have (two years by default, as today); MAX_ERR is
the maximum number of validation errors per authorized
CA to count this CA’s validation as successful (unset
by default); MIN_CAs is the minimum positive number
of authorized CAs that validated a domain’s SmartCert
certificate successfully (set to 1 by default).
Each policy has other metadata associated, like its
version, type (e.g., new or updated), and the number
of distinct CAs which have signed it. Security policies
should be long-term and stable; however, domains from
time to time would need to modify them. Each policy
includes its management key that can be used for the
policy update. In the case of the key loss or compromise,
the policy can be replaced by a new policy signed by
at least the same number of CAs as the previous policy
(see newPolicy()). At any given time, every domain can
have only a single “active” policy. We discuss the policy
contract management and other possible policies in § 7.5.
4.2. SmartCert Contract Creation
To create a SmartCert certificate, a domain has to
create a SmartCert contract instance first. Domains follow
the same code template to instantiate SmartCert contracts,
and we assume that clients are pre-loaded with the cor-
responding code hash of that template (thanks to that,
clients will be able to verify that the received SmartCert
certificates were created using the authentic SmartCert
contract code). After the contract is appended to the
blockchain it is initialized (see init() in Alg. 2). First,
the initialization procedure ensures that if the domain
has its policy, the SmartCert contract is created with the
private key corresponding to the policy key (creating a
binding between the policy and the contract). Afterwards,
the following contract fields are set: domainName is the
domain name for which the certificate is being issued;
pk is the public key of the certificate; created denotes
when the SmartCert contract was created; revoked is the
revocation flag; valid is the validity flag; revs is the set
of CAs that revoked the certificate; updated denotes the
time of the last SmartCert contract update; s[] is a map
of CAs authorized by the domain to keep updating the
contract and their validation states with three following
fields: lastUpd denotes the time of the last update of
the given state; lastErr stands for the time of the last
validation error (it can be either invalid validation proof
sent to validate or no data sent, i.e., a skipped validation);
errNo is the number of validation errors occurred so
far. After the initialization is completed, the SmartCert
contract instance is ready for deployment.
4.3. Public-Key Validation and Contract Update
In our scenario, SmartCert certificates carry infor-
mation about historical validations of their public keys
associated. To realize it, every epoch (a system parameter
discussed in § 7.3), each authorized CA conducts the
public-key validation with the domain and submits the
obtained validation proof to the corresponding SmartCert
contract to update it. The goal of this procedure is to
“convince” the SmartCert contract that the domain still
possesses the key pair, such that the contract can verify
it and update its storage to reflect the validation state
accordingly. Such a proof should be: a) short, so a smart
contract can process it efficiently b) authentic, proving that
the private key, corresponding to the public key specified
in the SmartCert contract, is being used, c) fresh, proving
that the information was produced recently.
The authenticity is necessary as it should be infea-
sible to produce fake validation proofs that a given key
in being used. Moreover, a SmartCert contract must be
able to verify that proofs are authenticated by the private
key associated with the public key that the contract was
initialized with. On the other hand, the freshness is critical,
as otherwise a malicious CA could just produce multiple
validation proofs at once and keep submitting them later to
the SmartCert contract over some extended time period.
Therefore, a SmartCert contract must be able to verify
that the validation proof is recent. However, these two
requirements are challenging to meet in the TLS setting.
Authenticity The TLS protocol was not designed to pro-
vide non-repudiation for application-level data. Therefore,
it is impossible to prove to third parties that a server
produced given data. However, such proof is necessary
for our setting, as SmartCert contracts have to be able to
verify that a given private key is being used. One possible
approach to tackle this problem is to design and deploy
a new protocol or an extension that would allow servers
to sign date [9], [61]. However, that may be undesired
as introducing a new dedicated protocol have side effects,
like larger trusted computing base and a long standardiza-
tion and adoption process. Instead of introducing a new
protocol, we make an observation that although TLS does
not provide non-repudiation for application data, the TLS
handshake messages can be used to achieve this goal.
More specifically, as described in § 2.2, during the TLS
Alg. 2: SmartCert contract.
PC is the global policy contract; lastBHash(i) returns the i-th last
block hash; lastBTime(i) returns the i-th last block timestamp;
now() returns the timestamp of the current block;
cliRnd, srvRnd, params, σ: elements of the signed message SKE sent
by the domain to the CA (see § 2.2, Eq. 2, and Fig. 5 for details);
s[] is a map of CAs and their validation states.
function init(name, key, CAs)
p ← PC .getPolicy(name);
if p 6= dfltPolicy then
assert sender == p.KEY ID;
created ← now(); domainName ← name; pk ← key ;
revoked ← False; revs ← ∅; valid ← True; updated ← 0 ;
for ca ∈ CAs do
assert ca ∈ p.CAs; s[ca].lastErr ← 0 ;
s[ca].errNo ← 0 ; s[ca].lastUpd ← now();
function update(cliRnd, srvRnd, params, σ)
ca ← sender ; assert ca ∈ s[] and valid ;
/* check for skipped validations of CAs*/
for tmp ∈ s[] do
missed ← b now()−s[tmp].lastUpd
epoch
c;
if missed ≥ 1 then
s[tmp].lastErr ← now()− epoch;
s[tmp].errNo ← s[tmp].errNo + missed ;
/* ensure that cliRnd is fresh */
epochStart = now()− (now()%epoch); fresh ← False;
for i ∈ {1, 2, 3, ...} do
/* check if the i-th last block is in the epoch */
if lastBTime(i) < epochStart then
break;
/* check if the i-th last block hash matches */
if cliRnd == ca‖lastBHash(i) then
fresh ← True; break;
/* check the freshnes and verify the signature */
if !fresh or !SigVrfypk (cliRnd‖srvRnd‖params, σ) then
s[ca].lastErr ← now(); s[ca].errNo++;
updated ← now(); valid ← isCompliant();
function revoke()
p ← PC .getPolicy(name); r ← 0 ;
if sender ∈ p.CAs then
revs.add(sender); r ← len(p.CAs)− len(revs);
if sender == p.KEYID or r ≥ p.MIN CAs then
updated ← now(); revoked ← True; valid ← False;
function isCompliant()
i ← 0 ; p ← PC .getPolicy(name);
for ca ∈ s[] do
if (ca ∈ p.CAs) and (s[ca].errNo ≤ p.MAX ERR)
and (now()− created ≤ p.MAX LIFETIME) then
i++;
return i ≥ p.MIN CAs;
handshake with a negotiated ephemeral DH key exchange
method, the server signs client’s and server’s random
values (CH.r and SH.r, respectively) together with the DH
parameters. The signature is placed in the ServerKeyEx-
change message (SKE) sent to the client; therefore, it can
be used as a proof that the server’s private key is being
used. CAs can obtain such proofs by simply running TLS
handshakes with targeted domains.
Freshness The message authenticity is insufficient for a
complete validation proof. A CA could conduct multiple
handshakes at once and keep using them later on as
“current” validation proofs. Thus, the second challenge
is to provide freshness for that information. Interestingly,
the client’s and server’s random values as specified in the
TLS specification [23], should contain a GMT timestamp
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Fig. 5: Details of the SmartCert contract update process.
encoded in the first four bytes of these fields (see Fig. 1).
Therefore, the ServerKeyExchange message containing
the server’s random value contains also the server’s times-
tamp. Unfortunately, we cannot rely on this field, as only
37% of TLS servers put accurate timestamps in their TLS
handshakes [72]. Moreover, the TLS protocol does not
require protocol parties’ clocks to be synchronized [23]
and some implementations randomize timestamp fields as
a prevention from fingerprinting [49].
One approach to solving this issue is to use external
time sources to timestamp TLS handshakes but that would
require the introduction of new trusted parties and reliance
on their availability. To overcome that problem, we make
an observation that the blockchain platform itself acts as
a source of time. Blockchain blocks are ordered (linked
by a hash function) and contain their creation timestamps
(see Fig. 2). Therefore, a CA could set its ClientHello’s
random field (CH.r) to the current block hash and conduct
a TLS handshake. Then when this value is signed by the
server (within the SKE message), it implies that the hand-
shake happened after the block was mined. Therefore, the
SmartCert contract will be able to verify that the validation
proof is fresh, checking whether the signed block hash is
recent (smart contract platforms, like Ethereum, natively
support accessing previous block hashes). In that way, the
validation will be automated and without introducing any
additional trusted parties or protocol changes.
Public-Key Validation and Contract Update The
public-key validation is initiated by a CA once per epoch.
The entire process is depicted in Fig. 5 and Alg. 2 (see
the update() method), and we discuss it in detail below.
1) The CA and domain execute a TLS handshake:
a) The CA gets the latest block (Bi) hash, creates
a hello message CH, prepends the hash with its
blockchain identifier (CAid ) and sets it as the random
field of the message:
CH.r = CAid‖H(Bi). (1)
The CA identifier CAid is added to ensure that any
other CA cannot replay the validation proof. The
message CH is sent to the domain.
b) The domain sends back the messages
SH,Cert,SKE, and SHD. The ServerKeyExchange
message SKE contains the signature over the random
fields and the key exchange parameters (see Fig. 1
and § 2.2). This signature together with the fields it
protects constitute a validation proof.
2) After receiving the proof, the CA prepares and dissem-
inates a transaction to trigger the update() method of the
SmartCert contract (see Alg. 2), that will be executed
with the elements of the validation proof as arguments:
update(CH.r,SH.r,SKE.p,SKE.σ), (2)
where CH.r is set to the block hash set by the CA.
3) Network participants (i.e., miners) constantly collect
new transactions and try to mine a new block.
a) Miners validate the transaction by executing up-
date(). The method checks if the submitter is an
authorized CA, if the certificate is still valid, and
executes the following verification logic.
i) Check if any authorized CA skipped a validation
and every missed validation count as an error.
ii) Check whether the message is fresh by comparing
CH.r with the previous block hash(es). Due to
the network propagation time [80], multiple older
block hashes can be checked (see § 7.3 for more
details); however, all these blocks must belong to
the current epoch (to avoid replayed validation
proofs). If the matching block hash is found, it
implies that the TLS handshake was conducted
after the block was mined (as the hash is within
the CH.r field); thus the validation proof is fresh.
iii) Verify the authenticity of the handshake’s SKE
message, i.e., ensure that it was signed by the
domain’s private key corresponding to the public
key with which the contract was initialized.
iv) Update the contract’s internal storage indicating
that it just got updated (i.e., the last validation
timestamp is updated). If any of the above checks
fails, the counter of errors is increased and the last
error time is updated.
v) Determine the validity status by checking if the
validation state is compliant with the domain’s
policy (see isCompliant()). In this check, the
contract gets the domain’s policy via the policy
contract and checks if a) the CAs updating the
contract are authorized, b) their validation states
are correct, c) the certificate lifetime is not ex-
ceeded, d) and the number of correct validations
is at least as specified in the policy. If the pol-
icy compliance check fails the certificate will be
marked and treated as invalid (i.e., valid=False).
At the end of this process, the SmartCert contract
has validated the authenticity and freshness of the
handshake message and updated its internal storage
accordingly to the domain’s current policy.
b) Miners mine block Bi+1 with validated transactions.
c) When the new block Bi+1 is mined and propagated
it becomes part of the blockchain. The block contains
the updated state of the SmartCert contract.
The update procedure requires an interaction with a smart-
contract platform. As we show in § 6.2 even with the
existing platforms the execution cost is acceptable.
Revocation Like in the TLS PKI, certificates can be re-
voked when they are issued by a mistake, their associated
keys are lost/stolen or not used anymore, or their owners
just wish to revoke them. A SmartCert certificate can be
revoked by a quorum of its authorized CAs or the domain
owner. In order to do so, the revoke() method is triggered,
which verifies whether the calling entity is authorized
and upon a successful revocation sets the revoked flag
to True and the valid flag to False. With that change,
the SmartCert certificate is revoked and immutable, as
Alg. 3: SmartCert certificate validation.
codeHash is the hash of the trusted SmartCert contract code stored
by clients; maxStale denotes the maximum tolerable difference
between the current time and the time of the last update of the
presented certificate (see § 7.3), maxStale > epoch .
function verify(name, addr, st, pis, pic)
/* check proofs authenticity and consistency */
if !AuthConsistentProofs(addr , pic , pis) or
!codeProofVrfy(addr , codeHash, pic) or
!storageProofVrfy(addr , st , pis) then
return FAIL;
/* check the name, validity, and freshness */
if st .domainName 6= name or !st .valid or
time()− st .updated > maxStale then
return FAIL;
return OK; /* continue the handshake with st .pk */
the update() method checks the validity status prior to
executing the rest of its body.
4.4. SmartCert Certificate and its Validation
SmartCert does not change the TLS protocol and it
follows the standard TLS connection establishment as
described in § 2.2. The only change is that instead of send-
ing an X.509v3 certificate, the server sends a SmartCert
certificate, which consists of the following elements:
addr is the blockchain address of the SmartCert contract,
st is the storage of the SmartCert contract that encodes
the domain name, its public key, and its current validity
status (i.e., whether the certificate is valid or not),
pis is an MPT storage proof proving that the given con-
tract instance’s storage is part of the blockchain.
pic is an MPT code proof proving on the code of the
SmartCert contract (without this proof a malicious CA
could deploy a contract with a different code).
To prevent replay attacks, the storage and the proofs have
to be fresh, so the domain periodically, e.g., every several
hours, fetches new proofs from the blockchain and serves
them in every subsequent TLS handshake. We emphasize
that this setup is privacy preserving as clients do not
contact the network for fresh proofs (revealing domains
they connect to). The SmartCert certificate validation is
described in Alg. 3. In the first step, the client verifies if:
a) the MPT proofs provided are consistent and authentic,
i.e., they correspond to the same smart contract address
addr and they belong to the blockchain whose block
headers the client stores (TLS clients are also blockchain
light client), b) the code proof pic proves on the correct
smart contract code (CAs have to follow the same code
template and the clients are pre-loaded with the hash of
this template codeHash), c) the storage proof pis proves
that the passed storage st belongs to the contract.
When the client knows that the storage corresponds
to an authentic SmartCert contract instance, the client
verifies whether a) the SmartCert contract is issued for the
contacted domain, b) the certificate is valid (i.e., compliant
with the policy and non-revoked), c) the storage is fresh
enough i.e., was updated no longer than maxStale seconds
ago. The validity of the SmartCert certificate implies
its compliance with the domain’s policy (note, that the
correct code template guarantees that the contract keeps
checking its compliance with the correct policy). In our
example, the SmartCert contract self-enforces the policy
by checking if the number of public-key validation errors
does not exceed the maximum number allowed and if
validations were successfully conducted by the minimum
number of authorized CAs as specified by the domain.
Interestingly, with changing policies and SmartCert con-
tracts, TLS clients stay almost unchanged, as they only
check the validity of the certificates while the compli-
ance checks and validations are conducted by SmartCert
contracts themselves. After the certificate is successfully
validated, the client continues the TLS handshake with the
domain’s public key specified in the SmartCert contract
storage (i.e., st .pk ).
5. Security Analysis
SmartCert provides multiple security benefits over
standard certificates. First of all, SmartCert provides a reli-
able and easy, yet powerful, policy framework supporting
domain expressiveness. Domains can publish their policies
specifying conditions under which SmartCert certificates
are considered valid. Policies can be authenticated by
multiple CAs (at least one); thus, SmartCert is not a
weakest-link system anymore. Furthermore, if a domain’s
policy is published it guarantees that a) no SmartCert con-
tract (and no SmartCert certificate, consequently) can be
created without the domain’s consent, and b) all SmartCert
contracts claiming the domain’s name will self-enforce
the policy. For the former, if there exists a policy for
a domain name, a SmartCert contract with that name
specified can be created only when it is authenticated
by the domain’s policy key (see init() in Alg. 2). For
the latter, SmartCert contracts with every update check
their compliance with the policy; thus, any non-compliant
contract will invalidate itself with the first update and
consequently will be rejected by clients (note, that clients
check if the SmartCert contract code is correct to ensure
that the validation rules are respected). An adversary can
present such an invalidated SmartCert certificate to clients,
but only for maxStale seconds from its latest update (then
clients will reject it – see § 4.4).
Beside authenticating policies by multiple authorities,
valid SmartCert contracts have to be successfully authen-
ticated by a minimum MIN_CAs CAs from the CAs set,
as specified by the domain. Therefore, it increases the
security as certificates are being validated by multiple
authorized CAs and it limits adversary’s capabilities as an
adversary compromising a CA can only update certificates
that have authorized this particular CA. An adversary able
to compromise multiple (m) CAs can try to impersonate
a domain by updating its policy. Such an attack will be
successful if m is at least equal the number of CAs that
signed the current legitimate policy. However, as assumed
the domain can obtain a new policy signed by n > m
CAs, and submit it to invalidate the malicious policy. As
policy keys are used infrequently (only for policy updates,
SmartCert contract creations, and revocations) they can
be stored offline increasing the security. However, in the
case of key loss or compromise, the same policy update
procedure is executed. Besides, all policy changes are
publicly visible so the domain should be able to quickly
mitigate these threats.
If a domain deploys SmartCert certificates without a
policy specified, the default policy is used. It authorizes
any trusted CAs to validate domain certificates, so an ad-
versary able to compromise a single CA can impersonate
the domain without a policy. Such an attack would be
detectable easily, as the malicious contract would be pub-
lished on the blockchain. In such a case, the domain can
quickly bootstrap its policy and revoke a certificate claim-
ing its domain name via the policy key. The adversary
would not get a successful validity status for the revoked
certificate (the SmartCert contract would self-invalidate
with the successful revocation), but she would be able to
use the old proofs for at most maxStale seconds.
SmartCert contracts encode their current validation
states; therefore, it is easy to get a better view of pub-
lic keys of contacted domains. More specifically, in the
presented setting, a SmartCert contract encodes the key
continuity measure and checks its compliance with the
domain’s policy, and then reflected the compliance in
the SmartCert certificate. CAs are obligated to conduct
public-key validations periodically, and this procedure is
enforced and monitored by the smart contract’s code. Such
a design allows to provide the functionality of notary
systems detecting and preventing various MitM attacks
where e.g., an adversary impersonates the website pre-
senting a different certificate. If a CA is presented with
the malicious key, it will be visible as it will be reflected in
the SmartCert contract. Moreover, a CAs without breaking
the blockchain platform cannot prefetch validation proofs
as they require recent pseudorandom block hashes.
SmartCert contracts are designed such that only autho-
rized CAs can update them and such updates are validated
by the code and individual domain policies. Therefore,
SmartCert minimizes trust placed in CAs. If a malicious
or unavailable CA does not submit a validation proof
within an epoch or submits an invalid validation proof,
the SmartCert contract will detect it and report that fact
in its internal storage. Similarly, a replayed or outdated
validation proofs will not be accepted by the SmartCert
contract as valid and an error will be recorded as well.
Consequently, SmartCert provides an important property
that if a domain is under a MitM attack during an epoch, it
will be reflected in the corresponding SmartCert contract
and issuing CA cannot refuse or hide this fact. This design
is beneficial not only for TLS clients but also for domains
who can detect attacks much easier just by looking at their
SmartCert contracts (see § 7.5).
SmartCert benefits from the underlying blockchain
platform in other ways. An immediate benefit is a high
availability, which turned out to be an Achilles heel of al-
most all security infrastructures. SmartCert certificates are
created and distributed via the blockchain platform, and
they contain all information required to validate them (like
a validation state and a revocation status). Domains obtain
fresh MPT proofs just by interacting with the blockchain
network, which is distributed, available, and censorship
resilient. CAs need to be able to only send transactions to
the blockchain network, but they do not need to invest
in any highly-available front-end servers to serve TLS
clients. It increases the security of the system significantly,
as an adversary trying to launch a Denial-of-Service attack
on a CA or wanting to censor CA transactions needs
to undermine the properties of the blockchain platform
what requires a (significant) control over the blockchain
network. Another important benefit of basing SmartCert
upon the blockchain platform is transparency. All policies,
certificates, and other CA actions are publicly visible.
Therefore, SmartCert allows to detect CA mistakes or
tailored attacks where a fraudulent certificate is created by
a malicious or colluding CA for a one-time targeted attack.
In § 7.5 we discuss how smart-contract platforms facilitate
such a monitoring. In addition, parties in SmartCert cannot
equivocate, e.g., by registered two policies for the same
domain, as long as they cannot undermine the properties
of the blockchain platform. Finally, SmartCert is privacy-
friendly, since SmartCert certificates are self-contained
and sent to clients by servers during TLS handshakes.
Thus, clients do not need to contact any other parties (like
CAs) or services to fully validate SmartCert certificates.
6. Implementation and Evaluation
6.1. Implementation
We implemented all SmartCert elements, namely a
SmartCert-supported client, server, CA, and smart con-
tracts. Although SmartCert can be implemented with more
performant permissioned blockchains (see § 7.1), we
present it in a more challenging open setting; thus we
selected Ethereum as the blockchain platform and imple-
mented the contracts in Solidity. For in-contract signature
verification, we used and extended the SolRsaVerify
package, which provides a verification code for RSA sig-
natures used in ServerKeyExchange messages (i.e., RSA-
PKCSv1.5-SHA256 [39]). We implemented RSA signa-
tures since they are most common as a TLS authentication
method [37]. The CA is implemented in Python and it
consists of a) a blockchain-communication module to
interact with the Ethereum platform and contracts, and
b) a modified TLS stack that obtains validation proofs
from TLS handshakes. The former module is realized
with the Web3py package that allows CAs to get a
recent block hash (used in public-key validations — see
§ 4.3 and Alg. 2) and send transactions to policy and
SmartCert contracts. For modifying the TLS stack we
used the tlslite-ng library. With our changes, prior
a TLS handshake, a TLS client can pass an arbitrary
string as its hello’s random value (CH.r), and then get it
signed together with the fields of the ServerKeyExchange
message (i.e., SH.r, SKE.p, and SKE.σ). We implemented
a SmartCert server with NGINX 1.15.2. Our server differs
from a standard TLS server by two following elements: a)
it periodically obtains fresh MPT proofs, and b) it transfers
its SmartCert certificate to the TLS client. The first func-
tionality is implemented with a help of the eth-proof
package, while the second one is realized by employing
the OCSP stapling extension [59] allowing a server to
piggyback a SmartCert certificate during a TLS hand-
shake. Moreover, such an implementation is backward-
compatible as SmartCert-unsupported clients can ignore
the extension (see § 7.2). SmartCert client, realized mainly
in Python, implements the TLS connection establishment,
parsing of the OCSP stapling extension, and the SmartCert
certificate validation logic (see Alg. 3), including the ver-
ification of MTP proofs (via the eth-proof package).
6.2. Evaluation
Smart Contracts Deploying and interacting with smart
contracts over Ethereum is associated with a gas cost.
Each operation costs a pre-defined amount of gas, and
operations can differ significantly in their gas consump-
Tab. 1: Cost analysis of the SmartCert contract operations.
create update()
+ init() Total SigVrfy() Misc.
Gas 1343799 165885 92623 73261
ETH 0.00289 0.00036 0.0002 0.00016
USD $0.361 $0.045 $0.025 $0.020
% 100% 100% 55.8% 44.2%
Tab. 2: A monthly deployment cost depending on epoch values.
Epoch 6h 12h 24h 48h 72h
Cost $5.05 $2.53 $1.26 $0.63 $0.42
tion. To estimate the cost in US dollars we used the
following data from https://ethgasstation.info/ obtained on
20 Mar 2020: we used the standard gas price equal 1.8
Gwei/gas (1 Gwei = 10−9 ether) with the ether price
equal $150/ether. We deployed our smart contracts on an
Ethereum testnet. First, we measured the cost incurred by
registering a policy with the policy contract (see newPol-
icy() in Alg. 1). The overall cost is around $0.23 and it is
mainly due to the transaction size and the storage required
for the policy fields. Next, we investigated how expensive
it is to deploy SmartCert certificates. In our experiment,
the contract was deployed for facebook.com, with which
a CA kept conducting TLS handshakes periodically (as
presented in § 4.3) and kept submitting obtained validation
proofs to update the SmartCert contract. Facebook.com
signs ServerKeyExchange messages with RSA-2048 and
the results of this experiment are presented in Tab. 1. As
shown in the table, creating and initializing the contract
is more expensive than updating it, and according to our
estimation, it costs around $0.36 (it is a one-time cost
per SmartCert contract). To update a SmartCert contract
by a validation proof, a CA has to pay about $0.045 in
that scenario. As depicted, the RSA verification is the
update()’s dominant operation, consuming almost 56%
of all gas required. The cost of maintaining a SmartCert
certificate is mainly determined by the epoch parameter
(see discussion in § 7.3). In Tab. 2 we present a monthly
cost depending on epoch values assuming a single CA (the
cost is linear to the number of CAs). As shown, the cost
is inversely proportional to epoch, e.g., the monthly cost
for a SmartCert certificate validated every day is $1.26.
Ethereum, like other blockchain platforms, is under
heavy development. Therefore, we envision that with
scaling solutions and more mature implementations (e.g.,
natively-supported RSA operations), the gas consumption
presented may be much lower in future, consequently
lowering the overall cost of SmartCert deployment.
CAs The main overhead on the CA’s side is to conduct
periodic validations which is equivalent to running TLS
handshakes (see § 4.3). To estimate the throughput, we
selected 10000 random hosts supporting TLS and we
conducted periodic TLS handshakes with them. We used
a machine equipped with Intel Core i7 (3.5GHz), 16GB
RAM, and 100Mbps wired Internet connection. This sin-
gle machine running connections in parallel could perform
around 175 TLS handshakes per second on average, i.e.,
0.63M handshakes per hour (the time is dominated by
the network latency). Thus, assuming six hours epoch,
only three machines could keep validating over ten million
public keys, which is similar to the number of active TLS
certificates currently issued by even large CAs [76], [78].
Tab. 3: The performance of SmartCert certificate validation.
Min Max Avg. Med.
[ms] 6.427 11.142 7.446 7.217
Transmission Overhead SmartCert certificate size is
the only transmission overhead introduced to a TLS con-
nection. To estimate it we used a SmartCert certificate
derived from the SmartCert contract deployed previously.
The main contributors to the SmartCert certificate size
are MPT storage and code proofs (pis and pic, respec-
tively). MPT proofs in Ethereum are generated for 32B-
long words; therefore, a domain’s public key (usually,
256B long) requires multiple MPT proofs. However, these
proofs are highly redundant, and in our scenario, the
SmartCert certificate needs 4.11KB to be encoded. As
reported [77], an average size of today’s X.509v3 certifi-
cate chain is around 4.75KB; thus, the size of SmartCert
certificates is comparable with today TLS certificates.
TLS Clients In SmartCert, TLS clients are also
blockchain light clients obtaining and verifying new block
headers (without actual blocks and transactions) from the
blockchain network. In Ethereum, block headers are about
508B long; thus, at the time of writing, the Ethereum
main network with 6.75M blocks requires from fully light
clients [26] the storage overhead of about 3.43GB. How-
ever, storing all previous header is not necessary for val-
idating SmartCert certificates. TLS clients do not accept
SmartCert certificates older than the maxStale parameter.
So, if a client rejects stale certificates with storage proofs
older than three days, then the client needs to keep headers
only for three last days (and keep dropping outdated ones),
becoming a partially light client [26]. In this example,
the storage required would be around 10MB. SmartCert
clients validate obtained SmartCert certificates (see § 4.4)
by sanity and control checks, and the validation of storage
and code proofs. To evaluate computation overhead, we
executed one hundred SmartCert certificate validations
and measured their execution time. The obtained perfor-
mance results are presented in Tab. 3. As shown, even
with our unoptimized implementation, the average and
median values are about 7ms. It is relatively small when
compared to latencies of TLS handshakes (around 200ms
on average [54]) and should not be noticed by users [32].
7. Discussion and Practical Considerations
7.1. Limitations
Although SmartCert provides multiple benefits it
comes with some limitations. First, despite designing
SmartCert with deployability in mind, we are aware that
our system introduces changes to the current ecosystem
that may be seen as radical. We demonstrate that the sys-
tem is feasible and efficient even when built upon existing
tools and platforms, but given deployment experiences
with other TLS PKI enhancement we should not assume
that SmartCert will be deployed right away as it is. We
rather predict that SmartCert would have to be deployed
incrementally, what we discuss in § 7.2.
Second, multiple aspects of SmartCert (like eco-
nomics, trust assumptions, and throughput) are influenced
by the underlying blockchain platform. We evaluated
SmartCert in an open environment to show that the certifi-
cate cost is reasonable even in such a challenging deploy-
ment scenario. However, we do not see any reason why
SmartCert could not be deployed with a more efficient
permissioned blockchain [8] (e.g., run by a consortium
of CAs, browser vendors, and non-profit organizations).
Alternatively, SmartCert could be also implemented on the
top of incoming permissioned networks, like Facebook’s
Libra [7], which would eliminate the costs of launching
and maintaining a new platform.
Lastly, projects offering free certificates rapidly in-
crease the adoption of TLS [3]. We see it as a very positive
trend, but we do not believe that SmartCert can compete in
adoption with (free) DV certificates as costs of deploying
SmartCert may hinder domains satisfied with the current
protection level. Instead, we see our scheme as a more se-
cure alternative addressed to security-savvy domains. We
argue that in the face of abandoning EV certificates, such
domains have no other choice than deploying domain-
validated certificates.
7.2. Incremental Deployment
SmartCert certificates cannot be introduced just by re-
placing X.509v3 certificates, as legacy TLS clients would
not be able to interpret them. One approach is to leverage
an extension mechanism of X.509v3 certificates [22]. This
mechanism allows to create a signed content that is part
of a certificate. However, a SmartCert certificate cannot
be efficiently implemented as an X.509v3 certificate ex-
tension, as SmartCert certificates are dynamic and their
state changes frequently (the X.509v3 certificate would
have needed to be re-issued for every such an update).
One way to deploy SmartCert in a backward-compatible
manner is to serve SmartCert certificates through the
OCSP stapling extension [59], which was designed to
piggyback revocation status messages on the TLS hand-
shake. Then, supported clients would be able to process
SmartCert certificates, while unsupported clients would
process X.509v3 certificates ignoring the unsupported ex-
tension. Usually, incremental deployment and backward
compatibility create downgrade attack opportunities [5].
We envision that the presented deployment models could
be extended by mechanisms like strict modes [35] or
pinning [28] to avoid downgrade attacks on SmartCert.
7.3. Parameters
SmartCert introduces epoch whose value constitutes
trade-offs between efficiency, availability, and security.
With a shorter epoch, the CA conducts public-key vali-
dations more frequently, minimizing the attack window.
On the other hand, shorter epoch requires more frequent
interactions between the CA and the SmartCert contract
incurring higher cost and overhead. Epoch determines also
how long CAs and domain servers can remain unavailable,
and what are tolerable blockchain confirmation times to
avoid forks (around 10 minutes in Ethereum). Taking
it into account and following a similar discussion on
the short-lived certificates, we envision that epoch values
could be in practice set between several hours and a few
days. Moreover, SmartCert could support an epoch value
per policy or even per certificate what would allow domain
owners to adjust their certificates to unusual use cases
(like backup certificates or certificates for inaccessible
subdomains). SmartCert contracts as presented use the
blockchain’s notion of time by calling the now() function
that returns the timestamp associated with the current
block. Open blockchains are peer-to-peer networks but to
guarantee only small clock desynchronizations it is part of
the consensus rules that block timestamps are consistent
with the previous timestamps and the time of the nodes.
Moreover, Ethereum nodes are “advised” to synchronize
their clocks with an NTP server, thus the time within the
network is quite precise (up to a several dozen seconds)
and does not constrain epoch values significantly.
CAs use current block hashes to prove that their
validation proofs are fresh. However, the time between the
public-key validation and the update() method execution
(i.e., between the steps 1a and 3b from Fig. 5) can be
greater than one block. To tolerate such delays, SmartCert
contracts check multiple previous blocks (see update() in
Alg. 2). The number of blocks checked, let us denote
it as N , is variable and can be platform- and situation-
dependent. For instance, it is reported [80] that almost
95% of Ethereum transactions are added and propagated
in about 300 seconds (the experiments were conducted in
2017), while of the time of writing the ethgasstation.info
website reports 115 seconds as an average delay for 95%
of transactions. Since the average time of a new block
arriving is around 15 seconds, we can conservatively
assume that in most cases N ≥ 300s/15s = 20. Epoch
bounds N , i.e., N ≤ epoch/15s in this setting; however, it
can be further bound since Ethereum contracts can access
up to 256 previous blocks, giving N ≤ 256, what in
practice means that a CA has to execute a update call
within around an hour (precisely, 256×15s = 3840s) after
a validation proof was obtained. Such a margin allows
CAs to avoid and recover from blockchain forks, since
Ethereum transactions usually require 30 confirmation
blocks to be seen as “secure”. An important client-side
parameter is maxStale (see Alg. 3), denoting the maximum
tolerable age the last public-key validation. A value of
this parameter should be greater than the epoch, and
similar to epoch, it introduces a trade-off between security
and efficiency. By following standardization of similar
parameters in TLS PKI [20], we envision that it can be
set between a day and several days.
7.4. TLS 1.3
TLS 1.3 [60] was recently approved as an Internet
standard. Although a quick upgrade to TLS 1.3 is rather
unlikely and should not be expected [66], [70], the pro-
tocol introduces a few important changes. As mentioned
before, TLS 1.3 removes the timestamp values from Clien-
tHello and ServerHello random fields. That change does
not influence SmartCert design much as it does not rely on
these fields. A more important change is the removal of the
ServerKeyExchange message type and the introduction of
a new CertificateVerify message type instead. Fortunately,
the semantics of the CertificateVerify message type are
similar. In particular, that message is signed and the
signature is computed over random fields supplied by a
client and a server in their hello messages, so SmartCert
can be easily adjusted to be operational with TLS 1.3.
7.5. Enhancements
Multiple Public Keys For easy description, we presented
SmartCert in a setting where a domain has one public key.
It is a common practice that for operational reasons large
domains posses and use multiple key pairs. SmartCert
can be easily extended to handle this case. Namely, the
SmartCert contract, instead of a single key, is initialized
with multiple public keys. Then, for a validation proof
submitted, the contract verifies if it was signed by a private
key corresponding to one of the preloaded public keys.
Validation Policies We demonstrate SmartCert in a
setting that improves the currently used and dominant
Internet-based domain validation, as the key continuity is
measured by periodic public-key validations conducted by
multiple CAs. SmartCert with “history-reach” certificates
enables to define and enforce almost arbitrary validation
policies; thus, we believe that other interesting SmartCert
contract code template(s) and validation logic could be
proposed. For instance, policies could specify that the
ratio of validation errors (errNo) is less than a certain
threshold (e.g., 10%). Policies could be also extended by
parameters regarding TLS connection properties like the
desired security level of used cipher suites (e.g., forward
secrecy) or HTTPS pinning [28]. The policy framework
could be extended to support other applications and their
features, like e-mail policies [43], [82].
Policy Contract Management We envision that the
policy contract would be managed by a standardization
body like the CA/Browser Forum. Such a body, like in
today’s PKI, could influence decisions on which CAs can
be added or removed from the trusted set or specify and
standardize available security policies. In particular, the
policy contract could store CA lists per browser vendor,
since vendors have different lists today. With such a
modification, certificates would have validation state per
vendor. We also see potential advantages of SmartCert
in terms of the on-blockchain CA keys management.
Blockchain platforms, as reliable time sources, by de-
sign allow to establish an order of events, that may be
especially helpful in revocation of compromised CAs.
Such revocations are risky for the ecosystem, as they
invalidate all certificates issued by the revoked CA as a
side effect. SmartCert could be extended to remove this
collateral damage from the TLS PKI [73], by revoking CA
with specifying the compromise time. In such a case, a
SmartCert contract would ensure that it was created prior
to the compromise time; thus, is still valid.
Notifications Blockchain platforms provide features that
facilitate smart-contract-empowered applications. For in-
stance, Ethereum provides asynchronous event notifica-
tions, which can be particularly helpful when combined
with SmartCert. With this mechanism, one could im-
plement the contracts, such that every policy update,
SmartCert contract creation, or public-key validation er-
ror, would trigger a notification accessible by blockchain
(light) clients almost immediately. Then, domain owners
would be able to listen for these notifications and in almost
real-time detect all policy changes, certificates created for
their domain names, or their validation errors. That could
reduce the attack detection time radically.
8. Related work
There are many systems that try to improve the secu-
rity of digital certificates and PKIs. Short-lived certificates
(SLCs) [62] aim to remove a revocation system [22],
[67] by designing certificates to be valid for a few days.
With SLCs domains have to conduct domain validation
more frequently what mitigates short-lived MitM attacks,
but as SLCs are irrevocable it also increases attack win-
dows associated with compromised keys. Despite multiple
tries to introduce them to the TLS PKI, SLCs were
abandoned [18]. EV certificates [29] aim to improve the
security of domain-validated certificates. To obtain an EV
certificate, an entity has to prove that it a) controls the
domain name, and b) is acting on behalf of the entity that
is controlling the domain name. The latter check is manual
and may require a face-to-face meeting; thus the value
proposition of EV certificates is better security. Security
benefits of EV certificates were questioned [19], [38] and
their support in main browsers may be deprecated in a
near future [65]. CAA [36] and DANE [34] are attempts to
introduce domain expressiveness to the TLS PKI ecosys-
tem, by allowing domains to publish at DNS(SEC) their
simple security policies, like trusted CAs. Unfortunately,
these schemes share issues of DNS(SEC), are difficult to
enforce, and their adoption rates are low [68], [75] Notary
systems such as Perspectives [81] and Convergence [48]
use a multipath probing to give better guarantees to a
client about the certificate she has obtained. They in-
troduce trusted notary servers, that when requested by a
client, check and return their views of the server’s public
key. Then, the client can compare her view with the no-
tary’s view and make a decision about the connection. Un-
fortunately, notary systems have privacy issues, increase
the latency of TLS handshakes, introduce new highly
available trusted parties [11], [52]. In SmartCert public-
key validations are automatically validated by the smart
contract code and recorded, providing reliable statistics.
Sovereign Keys [25] is a system logging allowing
domains to control (register or revoke) their certificates
and making them visible. It is extended by CT [45] which
aims to keep CA actions transparent. In CT, CAs submit
all certificates (prior their actual issuance) to a publicly
verifiable log which for every submission returns a signed
promise that the certificate will be appended to the log’s
database. A TLS client accepts a server’s certificate only
if it is accompanied with the corresponding promise(s)
from trusted log(s). As of the time of writing, CT is
deployed with 32 public logs operated by 10 different
organizations. Although CT is a significant improvement
of the TLS PKI, it has some drawbacks. Logs do not
run a consensus protocol so each log’s consistency has
to be monitored separately that requires external gossip
protocols [21], [55] run by clients. Logs have to be highly
available and from the initial deployment, this seems to be
challenging in practice [40], [41]. Moreover, CT provides
limited security properties, aiming for certificate visible
only, without asserting on its validation state.
Many systems improve CT’s security, efficiency, or
add novel functionalities. For instance, ARPKI [10] (an
improvement over AKI [42]) proposes a strongest-link
PKI that remains secure even if an adversary is able
to compromise all trusted entities but one. Properties of
ARPKI are formally verified; however, the system intro-
duces a static security parameter and requires significant
changes to CAs. ECT [64] enhances CT by introduc-
ing revocation and supporting the e-mail communication,
while DTKI [83] tries to relax trust assumptions of the
previous system, but assuming a trusted initial setup with
an honest log. The system is formalized; however, misses
Tab. 4: Comparison of the most related systems and SmartCert.
CT AKI/ARPKI PoliCert DTKI PKISN CONIKS + EthIKS CoSI CertCoin SCPKI BlockPKI IKP SmartCert
Main Goal Transparent TLS PKI Secure PKI
TLS Security 
Policies Secure PKI
Safe 
Revocation End-user PKI
Witness 
scheme Secure PKI Secure PKI Secure PKI
Malicious CA 
detection Secure PKI
Trusted Elements CAs + Logs CAs (act as logs) CAs + Logs CAs + Logs CAs + Logs CAs + Logs + Blockchain
CAs + L 
cothorities Blockchain Blockchain
CAs + 
Blockchain
CAs + 
Blockchain
CAs + 
Blockchain
Stronger Key Auth. ✘ ✔ (N CAs) ✔ (M CAs) ✘ ✘ ✘ ✘ ✘ ✘* ✔ (L CAs) ✘ ✔ (M CAs)
Security Policies ✘ ✔ ✔ ✘ ✘ ✘ ✘ ✘ ✘ ✘ ✔ ✔
Flexible Valid. Logics ✘ ✘ ✘ ✘ ✘ ✘ ✘ ✘ ✘ ✘ ✘ ✔
Revocation ✘ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✘ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✘ ✔
Key Continuity ✘ ✘ ✘ ✘ ✘ ✘ ✘ ✘ ✘ ✘ ✘ ✔
Non-equivocation 
Protection
Gossip 
(unspecified) N CAs
Gossip 
(unspecified)
Gossip 
(unspecified)
Gossip 
(unspecified) Blockchain L cothorities Blockchain Blockchain Blockchain Blockchain Blockchain
Audit Availability Every log 1/N CAs Every log Every log Every log Blockchain 1/L cothorities Blockchain Blockchain Blockchain Blockchain Blockchain
N is a global parameter          M is an entity-selected parameter          L is a global parameter but can be large in practice          * web-of-trust
an implementation and practical considerations (e.g., ECT
and DTKI increase the latency of TLS handshakes). An-
other approach with a similar goal is a distributed wit-
ness framework CoSi [71] where every seen certificate is
asserted by a large group of authorities (instead of one
or few, as in CT). The protocol scales due to a multi-
signature scheme deployed and its hierarchical network
structure; however, such a design requires coordination
among authorities. CONIKS [51] is an attempt of provid-
ing key transparency to end users. The system relies on
publicly-verifiable logs and provides interesting features
like users privacy. PoliCert [74] is a log-based system that
aims to better support domain expressiveness. Domains
in PoliCert can use public logs to publish fine-grained
policies describing their security preferences which then
are enforced by clients. All systems in that class share
the limitations of CT. They require either trusted val-
idators or a gossip protocol run by clients (this aspect
is usually unspecified) and assume highly available logs.
Moreover, some of them increase the latency of TLS
handshakes and violate privacy by enforcing clients to
contact logs, require new infrastructures, or need signif-
icant changes to the TLS protocol and its PKI. Unlike
these systems, SmartCert achieves the transparency, non-
equivocation, availability, and censorship-resistance bas-
ing on the blockchain platform; thus, without introducing
a new infrastructure. Moreover, in contrast to related work
where CAs are monitored by some other (new) trusted
entities, CAs actions in SmartCert are monitored and
validated by smart contracts themselves.
Up to our best knowledge, there is no work proposing
a similar to SmartCert concept, the blockchain technology
has been investigated in the context of PKI recently.
Namecoin [47] proposes a distributed namespace associ-
ated with public keys, what is improved by Certcoin [30]
which adds new functionalities (i.e., key revocation and re-
covery). Blockstack [6] builds upon Namecoin, combining
a distributed namespace and a storage system. Blockstack
allows anyone to bind a name with a controlled public
key and it leverages blockchain properties to make such
bindings transparent, available, and equivocation resilient.
The platform is fully implemented and deployed. Wang
et al. [79] propose to implement CT over blockchain
adding a revocation functionality. Their work requires an
application-specific blockchain, what may limit applicabil-
ity and deployment of the system. It also abstracts from
the current TLS PKI and and the complexity of real-world
deployment. SCPKI [4] proposes a blockchain-based iden-
tity system employing the web-of-trust model [2]. Interest-
ingly, SCPKI targeting end-user identities uses an external
storage for storing attribute data. Patsonakis et al. [57]
propose a blockchain-based PKI, whose main novelty
is a constant size cryptographic accumulator within a
smart contract storing and managing certificates. The work
provides a formal analysis but misses an implementation
and evaluation. BlockPKI [24] provides an automated
blockchain-based framework where multiple CA, synchro-
nized via smart contracts, efficiently issue certificates.
The system does not support any domain policies and
relies on short-lived (irrevocable) certificates. Blockchain
platforms are also employed to facilitate detection of
misbehaving trusted parties. EthIKS [15] is a proposal
for monitoring CONIKS logs using Ethereum, where a
special smart monitors the consistency of a log, replacing
a required gossip protocol. Another system is IKP [50],
where dedicated smart contracts incentivize blockchain
users for detecting fraudulent certificates.
In Tab. 4 we compare the most related work with
SmartCert. For every scheme we list its goal, trust as-
sumptions, and important features like key authentication,
validation logics, policies, revocation, key continuity, non-
equivocation protection, and availability.
9. Conclusions
This paper proposes SmartCert, a novel digital certifi-
cates framework. By leveraging the blockchain and smart
contract technology, SmartCert introduces “dynamic” cer-
tificates whose states can change but only according to
the encoded validation logic and security policies specified
individually by domains. Thanks to this design, SmartCert
provides properties and features that the previous systems
could not provide. Certificates in SmartCert self-enforce
flexible security policies, carry historical statistics of the
conducted public-key validations, the trust placed in CAs
is minimized as their actions are transparent and moni-
tored by the code, and the system provides high availabil-
ity, robustness, and censorship resistance. SmartCert does
not require major changes to the TLS PKI and is combined
with the TLS protocol. The system is practical, does
not introduce significant overheads, and can be deployed
incrementally, co-existing with X.509v3 certificates.
We presented SmartCert in the context of public-key
validation; however, in the future, we will investigate other
validation policies. For instance, the SmartCert framework
could be extended to support more sophisticated security
policies allowing domains to instruct the client about
other attributes of conducted connections (e.g., a domain’s
desired cipher suites).
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